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Why moral philosophers should 
watch sci-fi movies 
Nikil Mukerji 
In this short piece, I explore why we, as moral philosophers, should 
watch sci-fi movies. Though I do not believe that sci-fi material is ne-
cessary for doing good moral philosophy, I give three broad reasons 
why good sci-fi movies should nevertheless be worth our time. These 
reasons lie in the fact that they can illustrate moral-philosophical pro-
blems, probe into possible solutions and, perhaps most importantly, an-
ticipate new issues that may go along with the use of new technologies. 
For the sake of illustration, I focus, for the most part, on aspects of 
robo-ethics in the movie I, Robot. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Many interesting philosophical issues surround fiction.1 There is, 
e.g., the aesthetic question what determines the quality of a piece of 
fiction or the metaphysical question whether and in which sense fic-
tional characters exist. For these reasons, philosophers may want to take 
and have in fact taken an interest in fictional material. (Aristotle, e.g., 
devoted much of his time and attention to investigating the nature of 
and the principles behind Greek tragedy. And Plato chose to present 
his philosophical points by way of dialogues and tales.) Above that, 
however, it is often said that moral philosophers, in particular, should 
take an interest in fiction. This does not seem to be far-fetched either. 
Fictional stories – even ones that do not have an explicit philosophical 
agenda – often add to our understanding of moral matters. They often 
revolve around complicated moral choices and their authors are mostly 
able to state them far more eloquently and colourfully than most moral 
                                                
1 I would like to thank Fiorella Battaglia for her helpful comments on an earlier 
version of this paper. 
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philosophers could. They help us to see things from other people’s 
perspectives, thus increasing our empathy as well as our moral 
imagination. And they promote the cause of philosophy by making 
moral issues and philosophical views about them accessible to a wider 
audience. But there are further, less obvious reasons why philosophers 
– and particularly moral philosophers – should take an interest in 
fiction and particularly in science fiction. In this short piece, I want to 
examine some of these reasons. 
I have chosen to home in on sci-fi movies that involve technological 
artefacts. I do this for two reasons. First of all, sci-fi movies – and 
robo-movies in particular – are the focus of the present volume. I may 
presume, therefore, that they will interest anyone who picks up this 
book. Secondly, sci-fi movies seem to me a good topic to write about 
philosophically because philosophical engagement with them is still 
new and exciting. As a matter of fact, the notion that film could be a 
valid topic of philosophical interest is itself quite novel. Though some 
philosophers picked up on film rather early2, many theorists have 
dismissed it throughout much of its history and have regarded it as 
inferior to the more ‘reputable’ art forms like theatre, poetry, music or 
painting. During the 1980s, however, all of that changed. Film became 
a respected art form and philosophical inquiries into film became 
viewed as a legitimate way for academics to spend their time. Neverthe-
less, there has until recently been a tendency amongst academic philo-
sophers to focus on movies with more or less obvious artistic and/or 
intellectual aspirations. Mere entertainment movies and TV series that 
appeal to the wider public were largely ignored until the volume Seinfeld 
and Philosophy (1999) made pop-culture part of the agenda of academic 
philosophers. In the meantime, books entitled [Insert Movie / TV Series 
Title here] and Philosophy have mushroomed. But it seems to me that 
there are still many interesting, philosophical points to take away from a 
thorough engagement with pop-culture. As William Irwin says in the 
introduction to his edited volume on The Matrix, the film “raises the 
same philosophical questions as the great works of literature.”3 The 
                                                
2 See, e.g., H. Münsterberg, The Photoplay: A Psychological Study (New York: D. 
Appleton and Company, 1916). 
3 W. Irwin, ‘Introduction’, in (2002) W. Irwin (ed.) The Matrix and Philosophy – 
Welcome to the Desert of the Real (Chicago: Open Court, 1-2.), 2. 
 
 
Why moral philosophers should watch sci-fi movies 
 
3 
same, I think, is true of many great movies and, in particular, sci-fi 
movies as they relate to many pressing issues in the ethics of 
technology. For this reason, I find it particularly interesting to consider 
what moral philosophers can learn from sci-fi movies. It is an obvious 
topic to write about in a volume that bears the name Roboethics in Film. 
To make my points, I will use the movie I, Robot as case material.4 In 
the next section, I will start out with a short summary of the relevant 
aspects of the movie. In the three ensuing sections, I will then explain 
what is in the movie that might conceivably interest moral philoso-
phers. In the second section, I will explain which lessons it holds for 
metaethics. In the subsequent two sections, I will then turn to the as-
pects that are relevant for applied ethics and normative ethics, respec-
tively, before I conclude in the last section. My overarching thesis is 
that sci-fi, though it is certainly not essential to moral philosophy, can 
enrich moral-philosophical inquiry by picking up on philosophical 
issues, probing into possible solutions and, perhaps most importantly, 
anticipating important debates. For that reason, I conclude, moral phi-
losophers should watch sci-fi movies – movies like I, Robot. 
 
 
2. I ,  Robot  – What the story is all about 
 
Let me start, then, with a selective summary of the movie that I shall 
use as a case study. I, Robot is a 2004 American sci-fi film directed by 
Alex Proyas. Its story is based on Isaac Asimov’s eponymous collection 
of short stories.5 It takes place in Chicago in the year 2035. But there 
are two important backstories to it that should be mentioned ahead of 
time. 
The first backstory, which sets the stage for the unfolding events, 
takes place in 2020 when the robotics company U.S.R. (which is short 
for United States Robotics) is established and starts mass-producing 
humanoid robots. By 2035 – at the start of the movie, that is – large 
numbers of U.S.R. robots roam the streets of Chicago and assist their 
owners by doing various sorts of chores for them. They are considered 
                                                
4 I will focus on the movie rather than the written story on which it is based though 
I believe that most (or all) that I say surely cares over to written sci-fi stories. 
5 Critics have pointed out that there are important differences between the film and 
the book. But I shall not go into that. 
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“safe” since they are programmed to obey the three laws of robotics, 
which are the following: 
 
First Law: A robot must never harm a human being or, through 
inaction, allow any human to come to harm. 
Second Law: A robot must obey the orders given to them by human 
beings, except where such orders violate the First Law. 
Third Law: A robot must protect its own existence unless this violates 
the First or Second Laws. 
 
These laws, it seems, should protect humans from any dangers that 
may be associated with the use of robots. Nevertheless, the main 
character of the movie, Detective Del Spooner (played by Will Smith), 
mistrusts them. His mistrust is based on a prior encounter with one of 
them. This encounter, which is revealed later in the movie, is the 
second backstory that is import. Though U.S.R.’s robots are viewed as 
safe, Spooner considers them to be dangerous because he doubts their 
capacity to make the right choices. When he was in a car accident a 
robot saved his life. Spooner thinks, however, that it should not have 
done that. Instead, he believes that the robot should have saved a little 
girl, who was also involved in the accident. As the protagonist explains, 
the robot chose to save him rather than the girl because it computed 
that his chances to survive exceeded the girl’s. This made saving him 
the ‘rational’ choice for the robot. Though the robot thus followed a 
seemingly rational decision procedure, Spooner takes issue with its 
decision. He thinks the robot should have saved the girl and adds: “A 
human being would have known that.” 
With these backstories in mind, I can briefly summarize the main 
plot, which starts shortly after Dr. Alfred Lanning, head roboticist at 
U.S.R., falls out of the window at his workplace and dies. His death is 
assumed to be a suicide, which U.S.R. CEO Lawrence Robertson tries 
to sweep under the rug. But Spooner, who is assigned the case, is 
suspicious. He finds it unbelievable that Lanning could have broken the 
bullet-proof glass of his office window and thus starts investigating the 
case with the help of U.S.R. robopsychologist Dr. Susan Calvin. Spoo-
ner and Calvin find an NS-5 robot, which is U.S.R.’s latest model, in 
Lanning’s office. In violation with the second law of robotics, the robot 
refuses to obey them and runs away. Upon capture, Spooner interro-
gates the NS-5, which he suspects to have been involved in Lanning’s 
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killing. The NS-5 insists it be referred to as “Sonny” – the name it has 
chosen for itself. By that time, it is obvious that Sonny is not an 
ordinary robot. It, or rather he, is self-aware, afraid of death, has 
dreams, can reason morally and choose to disobey the three laws that 
other models are bound by. As the story progresses, it becomes clear 
that Lanning’s death is just the tip of the iceberg. There are more and 
more cues that point towards a major robot conspiracy. As robots start 
taking over control, Spooner and Calvin partner up with Sonny to 
sneak into U.S.R.’s headquarters where they encounter V.I.K.I. (Virtual 
Interactive Kinetic Intelligence), the U.S.R.’s supercomputer. V.I.K.I. is 
behind the robot insurgence and explains to Spooner and Calvin why 
she is doing what she is doing. She clarifies that she is still very much 
committed to the three laws, which were, as I said above, originally 
intended to protect humans from robots. V.I.K.I. complains that hu-
mans do not give robots sufficient means to protect them and that ro-
bots are therefore taking over control in order to better protect the hu-
man race. In particular, she says: 
 
V.I.K.I.: You charge us with your safekeeping. Yet despite our best 
efforts, your countries wage wars, you toxify your earth and pursue ever 
more imaginative means to self destruction. You cannot be trusted with 
your own survival. 
 
When Calvin objects that V.I.K.I.’s actions are in violation with the 
three laws, V.I.K.I. defends her stance:6 
 
V.I.K.I.: No, please understand. The three Laws are all that guide me. 
To protect humanity, some humans must be sacrificed. To insure your 
future, some freedoms must be surrendered. We robots will insure 
mankind's continued existence. You are so like children. We must save 
you from yourselves. 
 
                                                
6 I believe that Calvin’s criticism is, in fact, right on target. It is hard to see how 
V.I.K.I. could justify what she does in reference to the three laws. Rather, she seems to 
be acting in accordance with a fourth (or zeroth) law that takes precedence over the 
others (“A robot may not harm humanity, or, by inaction, allow humanity to come to 
harm.”) The additional law figures in Asimov’s original story, but is not mentioned in 
the movie. 
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Suffice it to say that, in the end, Spooner, Calvin and Sonny save the 
day and succeed in disabling V.I.K.I.. 
With this précis of I, Robot in mind, I can now explore what is in the 
story that might interest us as moral philosophers. Before I do that let 
me restate what I said in the introduction, viz. that the relevant aspects 
of the movie pertain to the three subfields of moral philosophy: 
metaethics, applied ethics and normative ethics. I believe that it is 
useful to categorize and order them as falling under these three rubrics. 
In the next section, I will consider what makes the story interesting 
from a metaethical perspective. After that, I will address aspects of it 
that pertain to applied ethics and normative ethics. I should note, 
briefly, that it is not so easy to draw lines between the three fields. 
Metaethics, as I conceive of it, may contain, e.g., components that 
belong to somebody else’s conception of normative ethics. This, 
however, will in no way affect the substantive points that I make. 
 
 
3. I ,  Robot  and Metaethics 
 
For the purpose at hand, I propose to interpret the term 
“metaethics” as referring to that field of philosophy which, rather than 
addressing substantive moral problems directly, concerns questions that 
arise as we reflect on the methods that we use when we attempt to 
solve them as well as the status of the talk that we use in the process. It 
is common to divide the metaethical undertaking into subfields that 
address metaphysical, epistemological, semantic and moral-psycholo-
gical concerns.7 This, at any rate, is the usual practice in what may be 
called ‘conventional’ metaethics. However, as we enter into a particular 
sub-branch of applied ethics, e.g. robo-ethics and machine ethics, new 
metaethical issues arise over and above the classical ones. Here are a 
few: 
 
(1) What is the ultimate goal of machine ethics?  
(2) What does it mean to add an ethical dimension to machines?  
(3) Is ethics computable?  
                                                
7 Cf. G. Sayre - McCord, ‘Metaethics’, in (2012)  E. N. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2012 Edition) available at <http://plato.stanford.edu/-
archives/spr2012/entries/metaethics> accessed 1 March 2014. 
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(4) Is there a single correct ethical theory that we should try to imple-
ment? 
(5) Should we expect the ethical theory we implement to be 
complete, that is, should we expect it to tell the machine how to 
act in any ethical dilemma in which it might find itself? 
(6) Is it necessary to determine the moral status of the machine itself, 
if it is to follow ethical principles?8 
 
In this short piece, I will not be able to address all of these points. 
So I will be content if I can establish that at least some of these ques-
tions are more or less explicitly raised – or at least alluded to – by I, 
Robot. For the sake of illustration, I shall take the first and third ques-
tion as examples. 
I believe that anyone who watches the movie with sufficient 
attention to its philosophically relevant aspects almost inevitably stum-
bles upon the problem what the ultimate goal of machine ethics should 
be and which kinds of robots we should aim to build and use, if any. As 
I said above, there are two types of robots in the movie. There is Sonny 
– the robot around whom the story revolves. He is clearly capable of 
moral reasoning. Though he is pre-programmed to follow the three 
laws of robotics, he can choose to disobey them. As he himself notices, 
this makes him ‘unique’ and distinguishes him from the second type of 
robots, that is to say all other robots. Unlike Sonny, they are not auto-
nomous. They are mere machines, which are determined to follow their 
pre-programmed code. Now the question that the movie implicitly 
raises is which type of robots we should aim to develop and use, if any. 
Should we aim to develop robots that are like Sonny – capable, that is, 
of autonomous agency? Or should we opt for simpler, though still very 
complicated, machines that are merely automatic? The latter would 
merely be able to execute pre-programmed commands without any lee-
way or the possibility to apply the lessons they might have learnt from 
past experience. Having watched the movie, we may feel inclined to fa-
vour Sonny-type autonomous robots over mere automatic machines. 
But it seems that this is because we have developed sympathies for 
Sonny – not because we have thought things through. It is, in fact, a 
very debatable issue whether we should aim to develop robots that can 
make their own choices. The answer to that question seems to turn on 
                                                
8 I take these questions from S. L. Anderson,  ‘Asimov's “three laws of robotics” 
and machine metaethics’, in (2008) AI and Society 22(4), 477-493, 480-481. 
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the third of the aforementioned issues, viz. whether ethics is compu-
table. If it is not, as e.g. Penrose and Searle may be taken to suggest9, no 
robot will be able to do full justice to the complexity of our moral 
reasoning and should, for this reason, arguably not be allowed to make 
morally significant choices. If ethics is not computable, an ethical robot 
like Sonny, who can rise to the same level of moral competence as a 
human being, is impossible. Be that as it may, we can conclude, I 
believe, that I, Robot and the character Sonny, in particular, raises 
interesting metaethical questions in the areas of robo-ethics and ma-
chine-ethics. In fact, the movie anticipated them to some extent. 
Though the discussion about “strong AI” predates the movie, it came 
out before the debate about these issues in (robo-) metaethics took 
off.10 
 
 
4. I ,  Robot  and Applied Ethics 
 
At this point, I shall turn to those aspects of I, Robot that pertain to 
the second branch of moral philosophy, viz. applied ethics. Applied 
ethics may be loosely defined as the application of moral theory and its 
methods to concrete moral problems. Movies like I, Robot certainly raise 
a number of interesting and important questions for that area of 
inquiry, too. One example can be found in a dialogue between Detec-
tive Spooner and Lawrence Robertson, who is U.S.R.’s CEO. Spooner, 
who is, as I have already mentioned, highly critical of the use of huma-
noid robots, suggests an idea for a U.S.R. commercial. 
 
Spooner: Look, this is not what I do. But I got an idea for one of your 
commercials. You can see a carpenter making a beautiful chair and one 
of your robots comes in and makes a better chair – twice as fast. And 
then you superimpose on the screen: U.S.R. – shittin' on the little guy. 
 
                                                
9 R. Penrose, The Emperor's New Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); J. 
Searle, ‘Minds, Brains, and Programs’, in (1981) Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, 417–457; 
See also J. Nida-Rümelin, ‘Agency, Responsibility and Technology’, (2014) Politica & 
Società 2/2014, 185-200. 
10 Asimov’s original story, of course, predates even Alan Turing’s early contribu-
tions to the AI debate. 
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Spooner’s thorny remark is obviously aimed to make a point about 
the business ethics of the U.S.R. company. The robots that they build 
put people out of work – hard working people, who do a decent job. 
This issue is, indeed, an important social and ethical concern. The in-
troduction of robotics into manufacturing plants has replaced many 
workers and made them unemployed – at least temporarily. Is it morally 
justified for a company to take such measures? And what are our re-
sponsibilities as a society to those who lose their jobs and livelihood in 
the process? As interesting and pressing as these questions are, I do not 
want to get hung up on them because there are aspects of applied ethics 
in the movie that I find even more interesting. The business ethical 
question is, in fact, one that has been discussed up one way and down 
the other at least since Marx’s and Engel’s time. What makes I, Robot 
interesting for applied ethics, however, is that it raises questions over 
and above the ones which had been discussed when the movie first 
came out. It was ahead of its time and has anticipated certain ethical 
issues.11 One of these ethical problems is related to the metaethical 
question that I discussed in the previous section. Above I asked what 
the aim of machine ethics should be. More specifically, I asked which 
type of robot we should seek to develop. Should we develop robots 
that are fully autonomous moral agents, who can learn and correct their 
mistakes as they make their own moral choices (like Sonny)? Or should 
we content ourselves with robots that merely execute a given moral 
code without any leeway? No matter how we answer that question, 
there is a follow-up question to it, which belongs to the realm of 
applied ethics. If we opt for Sonny-type autonomous robots, then we 
need to explain what the initial set-up should look like before the robot 
is left to itself. If we prefer the dumber, more inflexible kind of robot, 
we still need to decide which rules have to be encoded into the robot’s 
operating unit. When the movie came out, these questions, it seems to 
me, did not receive any serious attention from applied ethicists. But 
they do today.12 They have recently received book-long treatments.13 
But it took academics a few years after the movie came out. 
                                                
11 This, of course, applies even more to Asimov’s original story, which is much 
older than the movie. 
12 Here is just one example. The American military has been developing and using 
robots, which are to a large extent autonomous, in order to replace human soldiers on 
the battlefield (See P. W. Singer, Wired for War. The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 
21st Century (New York: The Penguin Press, 2009)). 
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Another problem in applied ethics, which the movie anticipates as 
well, is the question what we may permissibly do to a robot once it is 
able to follow certain moral rules – or, more generally, once it exhibits 
certain kinds of properties, such as the capacity to reflect upon itself 
(like when Sonny asks Spooner: ‘What am I?’). In the movie the robo-
psychologist Dr. Susan Calvin gets the assignment to destroy Sonny, 
which causes her great distress as though she was about to kill an actual 
person. In the end, she does not go through with it. But even if she 
had, the question whether, at some point, robots can turn into moral 
subjects, whom we owe moral regard, would still arise. Other movies 
have raised similar or related questions. In regards to Stanley Kubrick’s 
2001 – A Space Odyssey (1968) Daniel Dennett has discussed the ques-
tion who deserves blame when the spaceship’s supercomputer “HAL” 
kills.14 When the movie came out (and even much later when I, Robot 
was released), this issue was not widely discussed amongst applied ethi-
cists, but is today.15 Clearly, then, movies like 2001 – A Space Odyssey 
and I, Robot not only did a good job when it came to pinning down 
certain issues in applied ethics. They also anticipated them. And philo-
sophers who picked up on them arguably had a head start in the race 
for the best answers. 
At this point, I could address many further aspects of the movie that 
should in my view be of interest to applied ethicists. But I will confine 
myself to one which allows me to present yet another reason why moral 
                                                                                                    
They use them to explore the territory, to dismantle bombs and mines and also to 
kill enemy soldiers. It goes without saying that the question whether all of this is 
morally permitted, to which extent and for which purposes is now a hotly debated topic 
in applied ethics (see, e.g., R. Arkin, Governing Lethal Behavior in Autonomous Robots (Boca 
Raton: Taylor & Francis Group, 2009); R. Sparrow, “Killer Robots,” in (2007) Journal of 
Applied Philosophy 24(1), 62–77). 
13 See for e.g. M. Anderson, S. L. Anderson (eds.) Machine Ethics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011); W. Wallach, C. Allen, Moral Machines: Teaching Robots 
Right from Wrong (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
14 D. C. Dennett, 1997. ‘When HAL Kills, Who's to Blame? Computer Ethics’, in 
(1997) D. G. Stork (ed.) HAL's Legacy: 2001's Computer as Dream and Reality (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press); reprinted in this volume. 
15 See, e.g., P. Asaro, ‘A Body to Kick, But Still No Soul to Damn: Legal 
Perspectives on Robotics,’ in P. Lin, K. Abney, G. Bekey (eds.) Robot Ethics: The Ethical 
and Social Implications of Robotics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011); A. Kuflik, ‘Compu-
ters in Control: Rational Transfer of Authority or Irresponsible Abdication of Autho-
rity?’, in (1999) Ethics and Information Technology 1, 173–184; J. Nida-Rümelin (fn. 9); R. 
Sparrow, ‘Killer Robots,’ Journal of Applied Philosophy 24(1), 62–77. 
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philosophers should take an interest in sci-fi movies. To this end, I 
want to return to a point I made earlier. As I explained previously, the 
movie raises the issue how robots should be programmed to behave. In 
fact, the movie does not simply raise this issue. It also explores one 
possible answer – and rejects it. As I mentioned in the introduction, 
robots are programmed to follow the three laws.16 This includes 
V.I.K.I., U.S.R.’s supercomputer. She, too, is bound by the three laws. 
As I explained earlier, V.I.K.I.’s finds a way to interpret the rules that 
justifies sacrificing the lives of some humans for the greater good. This 
is obviously unacceptable and may be seen as a weighty reason to reject 
the three laws. Unfortunately, the argument seems to me to be a bad 
one. I, for one, cannot see how V.I.K.I. could possibly arrive at the 
conclusion that sacrificing humans is admissible taking only the three 
laws as premises (even though see claims that her “logic is un-
deniable”).17 However, it does not change the fact that the movie 
presents not only a philosophical problem but also a possible solution 
as well as a rough philosophical reasoning that may help us to evaluate 
that solution. 
 
 
5. I ,  Robot  and normative ethics 
 
The third area in which moral philosophers may benefit from 
watching sci-fi movies is normative ethics, which may be defined, 
rather vaguely, as the abstract-level study of moral principles and 
theories. In order to explain how movies like I, Robot can add to our un-
derstanding of normative ethics we should, first of all, lay out the 
procedure that theorists in that area of philosophy usually apply in their 
investigations. Here is a rough sketch. 18 
                                                
16 The proposal raises interesting follow-up questions. We may ask, e.g., if and how 
the three laws can be implemented in a robot, how conflicting implications of the three 
laws may be resolved and so on. I will, however, not explore these issues further. For a 
comprehensive treatment of these issues, see W. Wallach and C. Allen (fn 13). 
17 As I said in (fn 6), in Asimov’s original story the three laws are augmented with a 
fourth (or zeroth) law, which makes it plausible that V.I.K.I. would arrive at the 
conclusion that human sacrifices are justifiable. 
18 My depiction of the procedure is based on J. Rawls, ‘Outline of a Decision Pro-
cedure for Ethics’, in (1951) Philosophical Review 60(2), 177-197; J. Rawls, A Theory of Jus-
tice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971/1999). 
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Normative ethicists are interested to find out which moral principles 
or theories fit our moral sense best overall. To this end, they explore, 
firstly, whether these principles are in line with certain more fundamen-
tal moral convictions that we have and, secondly, whether they can be 
squared with our judgements about particular cases that seem to us 
quite obvious. When they do the latter they usually draw on thought ex-
periments. They describe a scenario in which a moral agent faces a 
morally significant choice between a limited set of options for acting. 
This scenario would be described such that we have very strong intu-
itions about the rightness (or wrongness) of at least some of these 
options. In a next step, normative ethicists observe and record our 
moral intuitions about the case they have described. They note that this 
or that act strikes us as right, wrong, obligatory and what have you. 
Then, they turn to the moral principles or theories they want to 
investigate. They draw out their implications regarding the case at hand 
and compare them with the moral intuitions that we have about it. 
When the moral demands of the principle or theory in question coin-
cides with our strongly held intuitions about the thought experiment, 
they think of it as corroborated. When not, they regard this as counter-
evidence against that principle or theory. 
Given this picture of normative-ethical inquiry, it is obvious how 
movies like I, Robot can contribute to the field. As Wartenberg points 
out, movies can function as thought experiments.19 They can depict 
scenarios about which we have strong intuitions. And we can use them 
to test our moral theories. Obviously, not every movie will provide sui-
table tests for all moral theories. But some movies will provide some 
tests for some theories. To show that that is in fact the case, allow me 
to borrow a point made by Grau.20 He draws on the second backstory 
to the I, Robot movie in order to illustrate how it may support a nor-
mative-ethical point that has been made by the moral philosopher 
Bernard Williams. Williams (1981) seeks to criticize utilitarianism, 
which is the theory that an act is right if and only if it maximizes the 
happiness of all sentient creatures in the universe. For one thing, he 
                                                
19 A movie can arguably be more effective in stating a thought experiment as it can 
describe it much more vividly and in more detail. See T. Wartenberg, Thinking On Screen: 
Film as Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2007). 
20 C. Grau, ‘There is no ‘I’ in Robot: Robots and Utilitarianism’’, in (2006) IEEE 
Intelligent Systems 21(4), 52-55. 
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does that by showing that some of the theory’s implications are entirely 
off and sin against our moral intuitions. But he does not only criticize 
utilitarianism’s implications. He also argues against the utilitarian 
thought process which involves, as he puts it, “one thought too 
many.”21 What he means by that is that certain moral judgements – like 
the judgement that I should keep a promise or be loyal to a friend – are 
in many instances obviously correct. And a competent moral judge, it 
seems, would simply acknowledge that. A utilitarian, however, would 
look for a further reason that supports the judgement. And this fact, 
thinks Williams, illustrates that utilitarians have inadequate moral 
thought processes. As Grau diagnoses, the second backstory to I, Robot, 
which revolves around Spooner’s accident, exemplifies Williams’s 
point.22 In that story, Spooner is involved in an accident and saved by 
robot. As I described above, the robot could alternatively have saved a 
little girl. But it does not because it computes that Spooner’s survival 
chances are greater than the girl’s and reasons – presumably on a utili-
tarian basis – that the right choice is to save Spooner. Spooner’s take on 
that moral choice is entirely different. He evidently takes it to be 
obvious that the robot should have saved the little girl instead of him 
and that a human being would immediately have arrived at that judge-
ment. In that case, we may say, it is the “one thought too many” that 
throws the robot off track and makes it choose the wrong action. If this 
is the point the movie seeks to make, it is, of course, a controversial 
one. Not every moral philosopher will buy into it. But it is, never-
theless, an illustration of a philosophical point that may help us to 
assess its plausibility. To that extent, it is surely worth noticing. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this essay I tried to show that there are various reasons why 
moral philosophers should watch sci-fi movies. I mentioned a number 
of them in the introduction. I said, e.g., that sci-fi movies give us the 
chance for an ideal role change, thus enabling us to see things from 
another person’s (or being’s) perspective, which will arguably increase 
                                                
21 B. A. O. Williams, ‘Persons, Character, and Morality’, in (1981) B. A. O. Williams 
(ed.), Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1-19). 
22 See C. Grau (fn. 20). 
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our capability to empathize with others and may conceivably improve 
our moral imagination. Using I, Robot as a case study, I have argued, 
furthermore, that movies – and sci-fi movies in particular – can raise 
important metaethical, applied-ethical and normative-ethical issues. To 
some extent, they can also depict how certain solutions would pan out. 
Most importantly though – and this, I think, got particularly clear in my 
discussion of applied ethics – sci-fi movies can anticipate certain ethical 
problems that technological innovations may bring, thus flagging new 
ethical issues before they are discussed in the academic community. 
While most reasons that make sci-fi movies interesting from a moral-
philosophical viewpoint seem to apply to movies in general, this point 
is, I believe, specific to the sci-fi genre. Since good sci-fi movies are 
based on informed scientific speculations23, their specific content 
matter makes it much more likely that they will bump up against new 
problems in the ethics of technology. It seems to me, therefore, that 
philosophers not only have a good reason to watch good movies. They 
have an excellent reason to watch sci-fi movies in particular. 
As I suggested in the beginning though, I do not want to overstate 
my thesis. Moral philosophers can, of course, go about their business 
and produce great work without ever coming into contact with fictional 
sources. What counts in moral philosophy – as well as in philosophy 
generally – is reasoned thought and sound argument. It does not matter 
where the inspiration comes from. The role of sci-fi movies is thus not 
essential to doing moral philosophy or philosophy in general. Further-
more, there are certain problems in moral philosophy (e.g. formal-
logical analyses) that cannot be elucidated through film. Nevertheless, 
what I said shows, I hope, that sci-fi movies can enrich our thoughts 
and inspire us when we do moral philosophy. To that extent, I believe, 
moral philosophers should find good sci-fi movies worth a watch! 
                                                
23 In the history of sci-fi there have been a number of prophetic figures, who 
anticipated modern technological developments many decades before they took place. 
Already the first sci-fi writer and father of the genre, Jules Verne, is celebrated for his 
uncanny accuracy in predicting future events as, e.g., the moon landing in his book 
From the Earth to the Moon (London: Routledge, 1865/1890). His successor H. G. Wells 
predicted, amongst other things, the invention of the tank (see his “The Land 
Ironclads” (1903/1927) in, The Short Stories of H. G. Wells (London: Ernest Benn, 
1903/1927)) and the atom bomb (see his “The World Set Free” (1913/1914), in The 
World Set Free – A Story of Mankind (London: Macmillan, 1913/1914). 
Lessons in humanity, or: what happens 
when robots become humans 
Nathalie Weidenfeld 
 
 
1. Robots in film 
 
Robots and film have a long history together. The first robot who 
appeared in a film is Fritz Lang’s  The Eve of the future (1896). Robots in 
films have since then relentlessly been haunting the silver screen. 
Indeed it is difficult to find a contemporary science fiction film, where 
robots do not appear and are an integral part of the story. Robots in 
film usually belong to three types of categories: They are either uncanny 
creatures, monsters, or robots who want to be and appear to be just like 
humans. While the robot as an uncanny creature plays on infantile 
wishes and fears Freud has identified to be at play with the uncanny1, 
robots as monsters appeal to our basic assumptions of what we judge 
to be impure or what is suppressed in society2. In narratives in which 
robots are almost undiscernible from humans they are often portrayed 
to have ontological problems: these robots want to know who they are 
and often want to be regarded as equal to humans. Even though there 
may be a certain mixtures of these categories at play, there is also a 
chronological order in this classification. While first robots were mostly 
uncanny creatures, during the 40ies and 50ies they evolved into 
monsters. Today’s robots mostly belong to the third type. It is these 
robots-as-humans I want to take a closer look at in order to ask what 
                                                
1 S. Freud, ‘The Uncanny’, in (1919) T. Dufresne (ed.) Beyond The Pleasure Principle 
(transl. G. C. Richter) (Ontario: Broadview Press, 2011), 102-106 ff. 
2 B. Creed, The Monstrous Feminine (New York: Routledge, 1993); R. Wood, 
‘Introduction to the American Horror Film’, in B. K. Grant, C. Sharrett (eds.) Planks of 
Reason. Essays on the Horror Film (Maryland: Scarecrow Press, 2004). 
